IPP评论是国家高端智库华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平台。

导语：

回望2025年
，国际秩序显露出多重变化：安全逻辑加速外溢，渗入贸易 、科技
、能源与数据；关税、制裁 、出口管制等从“非常手段 ”变成日常工具 ，全球化也从“效率优先
”转向“韧性与可控” 。与此同时，多边机制仍在运转
，却越来越趋向“程序性合作 ”，共识愈发难以生成
。权力更分散、规则更分裂
、成本更外显 ，各国正以“不稳定性长期存在”为前提重排国家议程。

正是在这一背景下
，IPP 荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织国际创意和可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问理事梅里·马达沙希提出一种结构性解释框架：全球治理之所以愈发困难，并非只是冲突增多 ，而是支撑治理的几张“地图
”开始分道扬镳——地缘政治的边界 、气候风险的地理
、技术能力的版图
，以及制度与责任的分配，不再沿着同一套逻辑对齐；同一个问题在不同尺度上呈现出截然不同的优先级 。

她据此将2025年界定为一个“门槛之年” ，也是一个“转轴之年 ”。在她看来
，危机不再只是偶发事件，而是在走向常态化
。文章由此追问：进入2026年 ，如何在多张重叠的版图之间搭建桥梁
，在缺乏共同罗盘的时代重建最低限度的协调与方向感，并重新把权力与责任连接起来。

梅里·马达沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）荣誉教授、联合国教科文组织国际创意和可持续发展中心（ICCSD）顾问理事

Honorary Professor of The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) ,South China University of Technology (SCUT) ;  Member of Advisory Board of UNESCO International Centre for Creative Economy and Sustainable Development（ICCSD）

正文

2025: The Future in a Year of Fractured Maps

2025：当世界版图开始碎裂，未来将走向何方

Introduction：When the World’s Maps No Longer Align

引言：当世界版图开始错位

2025年虽不算是国际秩序“轰然崩塌
”的一年，但自然也谈不上迎来复兴 。它的意义在于：越来越多的人开始清醒地意识到——长期影响世界运行的那些“图景” ，无论是观念上的 、政治上的还是空间意义上的
，已不再重合
。权力
、合法性、领土 、气候风险与技术能力，都沿着不同的逻辑各自运转。曾经看似统一
、仿佛可以整体把握的全球图景 ，如今已经走向碎裂
，甚至彼此冲突 。

The year 2025 marks neither a dramatic collapse nor a triumphant renewal of the international order. Its significance lies elsewhere: in the growing recognition that the conceptual, political, and spatial maps through which the world has been governed no longer coincide. Power, legitimacy, territory, climate risk, and technological capacity now follow diverging logics. What once appeared as a single navigable global landscape has fragmented into overlapping, sometimes contradictory cartographies. 

撇开冷战时期不谈，我从未经历过像2025年这样令人不安的一年——不只是因为多场重大冲突同时爆发 ，更因为人们越来越清楚地看到：有的冲突在地缘政治层面可能带来前所未有的影响
。

Cold War aside, I have never experienced a year quite as worrying as 2025- not just because several major conflicts are raging but because it is becoming clear that one of them has geopolitical implications of unparalleled importance.

北约各国政府正处在高度戒备状态
，紧盯任何可能出事的信号——不管是承载全球电子通信流量的海底电缆可能被切断，还是无人机在试探其防御体系的薄弱环节。与此同时 ，黑客也在不断升级手段
，试图让政府机构和应急系统“停摆 ” 。

Nato governments are on high alert for any signs that the undersea cables carrying electronic traffic may be cut or thedrones are testing the weakness of their defence system. Already hackers develop ways of putting governmental institutions and emergency systems out of operations.

2025年被三场性质迥异的战争所标记：乌克兰战事造成约1.4万人伤亡；加沙战争已致约7万人死亡，其中包括3万名妇女和儿童；以及苏丹境内两支军事派别之间爆发的极其残酷的内战
。

The year 2025 has been marked by three very different wars. There is Ukraine with 14 thousands casualties, Gaza with 70,000 killed including 30,000 women and children and the ferocious civil war between two military factions in Sudan.

加沙地带，孩子们坐在帐篷外。图源：联合国儿童基金会

然而
，在即将到来的2026年，俄罗斯注意到美国总统其实对欧洲兴趣寥寥 ，似乎已经准备好、也有意推动自身取得更大程度的主导地位 。与此同时
，莫斯科也清楚地意识到：2025年发生了一件此前多数西方国家都难以想象的事——美国总统可能正背弃自二战结束以来一直延续至今的战略体系，而且这位总统现在也反对欧洲目前的发展方向
。这种令人震惊的观点 ，在那份声称欧洲正面临“文明被抹除的严峻前景
”的新国家安全战略报告中变得清晰起来。

In the coming year, 2026, though, Russia nothing apparent lack of the American President interest to Europe, seems ready and willing to push for much greater territorial dominance. It is gratefully aware that 2025 has presented a possibility that an American president might turn his back on the strategic system vis-a-Europe, which has been in force since WW2, but is now also disapproves of the directions Europe is heading in. This shocking view became clear through the new national security strategy report that claims Europe now faces the “stark prospect of civilisational erasure”.

2025年或许不会被记作一次突如其来的整体崩塌
，但更可能被视为一个关键的转折之年 。在这一年，战略竞争加剧 、政治走向碎片化
、贸易日益安全化、制度运转显露疲态——多重趋势交汇叠加 ，使“危机 ”不再只是国际关系中的偶发例外
，而逐渐演变为一种常态化的运行状态。

2025 may come to be remembered not as a single moment of collapse, but as a hinge year, when strategic rivalry, political fragmentation, trade securitisation, and institutional fatigue converged, transforming crisis from an exception into a governing condition of international relations.

这种区分至关重要
。因为，一个“经历危机
”的世界 ，与一个开始在危机中运转 、甚至以危机来治理的世界
，完全不是一回事。这种碎片化并非阶段性的偶发波动，而是一种结构性变化 。20世纪末遗留下来的制度、规范与基本假设仍在延续 ，但支撑它们的现实条件却在不断被侵蚀
。到了2025年，世界依然在被治理——只是越来越缺乏一个共同的方向标。结果并不只是混乱
，更是一种系统性的错位：问题与解决方案之间错位，责任与能力之间错位 ，全球层面的雄心与地方层面的现实之间错位 。

This distinction matters. Because a world that experiences a crisis is very different from a world that begins to govern through crisis. This fragmentation is not episodic. It is structural. The institutions
，norms, and assumptions inherited from the late twentieth century persist, yet the conditions that sustained them have eroded. In 2025, the world is still governed but increasingly without a shared compass. The result is not chaos alone, but misalignment: between problems and solutions, responsibility and capacity, global ambition and local reality.

我想强调，2025年应当被理解为一个“门槛之年”：未来不再只是线性延伸 ，而是出现了断裂
。要理解这一年的意义
，就必须把地缘政治
、气候、城市与制度层面的裂痕放在同一张图里看——它们不是彼此孤立的危机事件，而是同一场结构性转型的不同表征；共同指向的是：世界被组织与被治理的方式 ，正在发生更深层次的重组。

I am trying to argue that 2025 should be understood as a threshold year: a moment when the future decisively stops resembling an extension of the recent past. To grasp its meaning, one must read the fractures geopolitical, climatic, urban, and institutional not as isolated crises, but as expressions of a deeper reordering of how the world is organised and governed.

A Fractured World Order: Authority Without Direction

分裂中的世界秩序：权威犹在
，方向已失

在地缘政治层面，2025年暴露出全球领导力核心的一种悖论：国际体系依然高度制度化 ，却越来越难形成共同的方向感 。既有大国仍保有影响力
，但同时深陷内部极化 、共识衰退；新兴大国不断强化战略自主，却往往回避全球治理所伴随的责任与成本
。其结果是——权威仍在 ，却缺乏协调。

At the geopolitical level, 2025 exposes a paradox at the heart of global leadership. The international system remains densely institutionalised, yet increasingly incapable of producing collective direction. Established powers retain influence but face internal polarisation and declining consensus. Emerging powers assert strategic autonomy but often resist the burdens associated with global stewardship. The result is authority without coordination.

多边机构在程序层面仍在运转，但其所承载的规范性约束力与凝聚力正在明显减弱 。共识变得更脆
，谈判更趋防御，宏大的共同目标则一再被搁置
。这未必意味着多边主义已经走到尽头 ，却很可能意味着它正在转型——逐渐演变为一种更功利
、更碎片化的运行方式。治理并未消失
，但呈现出明显的选择性：在某些领域依然有效，在另一些领域却格外脆弱 。

Multilateral institutions continued function procedurally, but their normative gravitational pull has weakened. Consensus has become thinner, negotiation more defensive, and ambition frequently postponed. While this may not signal the end of multilateralism, but it could lead its transformation into a more transactional, fragmented practice. Governance persists, but it is selective - robust in some domains- fragile in others.

在2025年预备COP30气候谈判中
，富裕的西方国家、石油生产国和最易受气候变化影响的小国等谈判集团之间存在错综复杂的矛盾分歧。即便是欧盟内部，在制定新目标时也出现了拉锯战
。图源：路透社

到了2025年 ，移民压力 、非正规城市化
、海岸退化与粮食不安全在多个地区相互交织——这些地区早已穿透并打破了传统的“南北之分 ”。风险不再局限于某些特定国家
，而是开始集中聚集在三角洲、沿海地带 、特大城市，以及长期被忽视的边缘地区 。

In 2025, migration pressures, informal urbanisation, coastal degradation, and food insecurity intersect across regions that cut through conventional distinctions between North and South. Risk is no longer confined to specific countries; it clusters around deltas, coastlines, megacities, and neglected peripheries.

这些带有结构性力量的转型 ，正在以制度化
、强约束的方式重塑安全、金融和战略同盟；与之形成对照的是
，气候适应 、城市不平等与环境韧性等议题，往往被放入自愿性
、软约束的治理框架之中 ，因此更显脆弱
。这种不对称，正在塑造一种新的责任地理：风险被全球化
，而应对却被地方化。

These transformative processes affect security, finance, and strategic alliances with different structures, while , by contrast, climate adaptation, urban inequality, and environmental resilience, that are often relegated with voluntary frameworks will be vulnerable. This asymmetry produces a new geography of responsibility: risks are globalised, while responses are localised.

A world re-arming, re-aligning, and hedging

重新武装、重新结盟 、并不断对冲风险的世界

回望2025年的世界，有一种趋势已不容忽视：主要大国一方面不断强调稳定的重要性 ，另一方面却在为长期对抗做着系统性的准备 。

Look around the world in 2025, and one pattern is impossible to ignore: major powers are preparing for long-term confrontation, even while insisting they want stability.

全球年度军费开支已突破2.4万亿美元
，达到二战以来的最高水平
。国防预算的上升并非集中于某一地区，而是几乎在全球同步发生——美国、欧洲
、东亚以及中东均不例外。美国正在推进核“三位一体
”的现代化 ，并扩张其国防工业基础 。中国则持续推进的军事与海军扩张
，目前已按舰艇数量计算，拥有世界上规模最大的海军
。

Global military spending has now surpassed $2.4 trillion annually, the highest level since World War II. Defence budgets are rising not just in one region, but everywhere — in the United States, Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. The US is modernising its nuclear triad and expanding its defence-industrial base. China continues its rapid military and naval expansion, now possessing the world’s largest navy by ship count. 

俄罗斯已经全面转入战时经济模式。在长期投入不足之后 ，欧洲国家正加快重新武装
，北约内部的国防开支也在实际意义上出现了两位数增长 。与此同时，同盟关系一方面在收紧 ，另一方面也在进行风险对冲
。各国在公开场合继续作出承诺
，却在私下里分散合作对象、供应链和安全保障来源。信任并未消失，但已经不再是毫无保留的信任 。

Russia has fully shifted to a war economy. European states, after decades of underinvestment, are rearming at speed, with defence spending across NATO rising by double digits in real terms. At the same time, alliances are tightening, but they are also hedging. States are committing publicly while quietly diversifying partners, supply chains, and security guarantees. Trust exists, but it is no longer blind.

当地时间2025年12月11日，北约秘书长马克·吕特出席在柏林举行的慕尼黑安全会议并发表演讲。他警告称
，北约的欧洲成员国可能成为“俄罗斯的下一个目标”，呼吁迅速增加国防开支
。

冷战时期 ，威慑固然令人心生恐惧
，但它是高度结构化的：有清晰的红线，有热线机制 ，有成型的战略理论
，也有对灾难性后果的共同认知。而到了2025年，威慑却显得更加单薄 、脆弱 。升级风险之所以更高 ，并不是因为领导人更加鲁莽
，而是因为牵涉的领域更多
、参与的行为体更多，所依赖的技术也更加复杂
。一次网络攻击、一场卫星系统干扰 ，或一轮供应链冲击
，都可能在无需发射一枚导弹的情况下，产生具有战略层面的后果。

During the Cold War, deterrence was terrifying, but it was also structured. There were red lines, hotlines, doctrines, and shared understandings of catastrophe.In 2025, deterrence feels thinner. Escalation risks are higher, not because leaders are reckless, but because more domains, more actors, and more technologies are involved. A cyberattack, a satellite disruption, or a supply-chain shock can now have strategic consequences, without ever firing a missile.

危机管理机制依然存在 ，但对其有效性的信任正在流失 。沟通环境更加嘈杂，信息本身也充满争议
。各国领导人不得不在持续的国内压力之下
，以更快的节奏 、在更低确定性的条件下作出决策。

Crisis-management mechanisms still exist, but trust in them has eroded. Communication is noisier. Information is contested. Leaders must act faster, with less certainty, under constant domestic pressure.

当下真正的危险，并非蓄意发动战争 ，而是在高压环境下发生的误判与失算 。这并不是在为一场特定的战争做准备
，而是在为一个充满危险的长期时代作准备
。

The danger today is not deliberate war, it is miscalculation under stress.This is not preparation for a single war. It is preparation for a long era of danger.

在2025年，安全已不再仅仅意味着坦克
、部队或航空母舰；它所涵盖的内容还包括：

Security in 2025 is no longer confined to tanks, troops, or aircraft carriers.It now includes:

网络空间 ，在那里
，一次攻击就可能瘫痪医院、港口，甚至干扰选举进程。

Cyber space, where attacks can paralyse hospitals, ports, or elections.

外层空间 ，在那里
，卫星支撑着通信 、导航以及金融体系的运行 。

Space, where satellites underpin communications, navigation, and finance.

能源领域，其中的关键咽喉要道与价格冲击足以动摇政治稳定
。

Energy, where chokepoints and price shocks can destabilise governments.

数据与半导体领域 ，在这里
，掌控权意味着经济与军事上的双重优势。

Data and semiconductors, where control means economic and military advantage.

供应链体系，一旦发生中断 ，便可能使整个产业陷入瘫痪 。

Supply chains, where disruption can cripple entire industries.

这些新的安全领域催生了一种国家安全外延化的逻辑，并正在重塑其所触及的一切——其中也包括贸易。贸易不再被视为创造稳定的工具
，而是被当作一种战略武器来运用
。关税
、出口管制、制裁以及产业补贴已不再是应急手段，而是日常化的权力工具。战略性产业受到重点保护 ，技术流动被严格限制
，而相互依赖性本身也被视为一种脆弱性 。

These new categories give rise to logic of expanded national security and it is reshaping everything it touches including trade which is now treated as weapon instead of a tool for creating stability. Tariffs, export controls, sanctions, and industrial subsidies are no longer emergency tools, they are routine instruments of power. Strategic industries are protected. Technology flows are restricted. Dependencies are treated as vulnerabilities.

有必要澄清的是，尽管到2026年全球贸易体系仍将继续存在 ，但它已经发生碎片化
。以效率为核心驱动的贸易时代正在让位于以安全为导向的贸易逻辑。供应链将受到更严格的审视
，既有的相互依赖将被重新界定为脆弱性，经济工具也将被公开用于战略施压与博弈 。全球贸易规模或许尚未崩塌 ，但人们对贸易的信任已经动摇
。全球化正在被重新设计
，而相互依存不再自动带来稳定——在许多情况下，它反而制造焦虑。

It worth clarifying that while the global trading system will continue to exist in 2026, but it is fractured. The age of trade driven primarily by efficiency has given way to trade driven by security. Supply chains will be scrutinised, dependencies will be reclassified as vulnerabilities, and economic instruments will openly be used for strategic leverage. Global trade volumes may not have collapsed, but trust in trade has. Globalisation will be redesigned. Interdependence no longer guarantees stability. In many cases, it generates anxiety.

围绕特朗普关税是否合法及是否延续 、美中贸易协议能否落地
、欧美是否对华采取更多贸易限制
，以及美加墨自贸协定走向的不确定性，将把全球贸易的不稳定性延续到2026年 。图源：路透社

作为全球碎片化镜像的气候治理

Climate Governance as a Mirror of Global Fragmentation

气候治理 ，或许最能清楚地映照出这一碎片化秩序
。到2026年，科学不确定性已不再是主要障碍
，真正的难题在于政治与制度能力——也就是，能否把共同的判断转化为协调一致的行动。

Climate governance offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this fractured order. By 2026, scientific uncertainty is no longer the obstacle. The central challenge will be political and institutional capacity: the ability to translate shared diagnosis into coordinated action.

一个很少登上头条、却在2025年深刻塑造全球气候治理不作为的重要因素 ，是将单边的领土介入
，作为威慑与施压工具的战略性运用 。

An important issue which never made the headlines but still remained as one of the most consequential dynamics shaping global climate inaction in 2025 was the strategic use of unilateral territorial interventions as instruments of intimidation. 

这些行动——无论是通过公开的军事存在 、事实上的吞并，还是对争议空间的强制性控制——其影响早已超出主权本身
。它们制造出一种高度不确定的安全环境 ，迫使各国重新排序国家优先事项
，而代价往往是长期环境承诺被挤到一旁。对许多国家而言，尤其是中等和中低收入国家 ，领土不稳定释放出的信号十分清晰：一个安全不再由集体机制加以保障的世界
，正在回归 。

These actions whether through overt military presence, de facto annexation, or coercive control of contested spaces extend beyond questions of sovereignty. They generated a climate of uncertainty that reorders national priorities, often to the detriment of long-term environmental commitments. For many states, particularly middle- and small-income countries, territorial instability signaled a return to a world where security is no longer collectively guaranteed. 

在这样的环境下，本质上依赖合作、面向未来
、又高度耗费资源的气候减缓与适应行动 ，正变得越来越容易在政治优先级的重新排序中被边缘化。面对战略压力的政府
，无论过去还是现在，都更倾向于把财政能力转向国防、能源安全和边境管控 ，并将气候行动视为次要议题，甚至变成可以讨价还价的对象
。

In such an environment, climate mitigation and adaptation—by definition cooperative, future-oriented, and resource-intensive, appear increasingly vulnerable to political reprioritisation. Governments facing strategic pressure were and are more likely to divert fiscal capacity toward defence, energy security, and border control, framing climate action as a secondary or even negotiable concern.

以信任 、互惠和长期时间尺度为基础的气候协定
，在这种规范性信心不断被侵蚀的环境中，显得尤为脆弱。如果支撑国际合作的秩序本身正在松动 ，各国又凭什么要为减排承担眼前
、切实可感的成本？

Climate agreements, which rely on trust, reciprocity, and long time horizons, are particularly exposed to this erosion of normative confidence. Why incur near-term costs for emissions reductions if the international order that underwrites cooperation appears increasingly fragile?

在多边层面
，这种侵蚀体现为一种“战略性的最低限度主义 ” 。各国在形式上仍然参与气候谈判，但立场愈发谨慎 ，更强调灵活性
，而非雄心
。承诺被不断附加条件，时间表一再拉长 ，落实则持续后移。这或许不应被简单理解为对气候问题的否认
，而更像是一种“气候犹疑”——其背后的认知是：地缘政治格局变化的速度，已经快于气候治理体系所能稳定下来的速度 。

At the multilateral level, this erosion manifested itself as strategic minimalism. States remained formally engaged in climate negotiations, yet adopted cautious positions that prioritise flexibility over ambition. Pledges became conditional, timelines extended, and implementation was deferred. Probably, this could be interpreted not as climate denial, but climate hesitation, rooted in the perception that the geopolitical ground is shifting faster than the climate regime can stabilise.

在这样的背景下 ，COP30等进程或许将同时象征着延续与张力：它们一方面重申了多边参与的持续存在
，另一方面也清晰暴露出多边机制的边界
。承诺层出不穷，但落实依然参差不齐。适应议题的地位显著上升 ，这在某种程度上也隐含着一种共识——仅靠减缓行动，已不足以避免严重冲击 。（相关文章：）

In that light, processes such as COP30 could symbolise both continuity and strain. They reaffirm the persistence of multilateral engagement, yet simultaneously reveal its limits. Commitments proliferate, but implementation remains uneven. Adaptation has risen to prominence, signaling an implicit acknowledgment that mitigation alone will not avert severe disruption.（Read more in：）

COP30——联合国气候变化框架公约缔约方大会第三十届会议，巴西贝伦
。图源：欧洲议会

真正的危险并不只是失败本身 ，而是对“不充分
”的常态化接受：这一转变标志着一次关键的心理与政治转折。气候治理不再仅仅围绕防止灾难发生来展开
，而是逐渐转向如何管理灾难后果 。责任在原则层面得到承认，却在实践中被不断分散
。全球气候版图 ，如同地缘政治版图一样
，更多呈现的是妥协，而非协调与一致。

This shift marks a critical psychological and political transition. Climate governance is no longer framed solely around preventing catastrophe, but around managing its consequences. Responsibility is recognised in principle, yet dispersed in practice. The global climate map, like the geopolitical one, reflects compromise more than coherence.

这是一个渐进式进展与风险持续上升并存的世界——一个雄心被不断下调、更多去适应政治上的可行性 ，而非地球真正所需尺度的世界 。

The danger is not failure alone, but normalisation of inadequacy: a world in which incremental progress coexists with escalating risk, and ambition is continuously recalibrated downward to match political feasibility rather than planetary necessity.

很多国际机构原本是为促进合作而设立的
，但到了2025年，善意正变得越来越稀缺。规则被选择性适用 ，一旦不合时宜
，多边平台就被绕开
。多边主义依然存在，却越来越像一个按需取用的工具箱 ，而不再是一项需要共同维护的事业。这并不是一场轰然倒塌的制度危机，而是一种更隐蔽 、也更危险的状态——制度性的疲惫 。

International institutions were designed for cooperation in good faith. In 2025, good faith is in short supply.Rules are applied selectively. Forums are bypassed when inconvenient. Multilateralism survives, but increasingly as a toolbox rather than a shared project.This is not institutional failure in a dramatic sense. It is something quieter and more dangerous: institutional exhaustion.

2025年留下的遗产：一个在危机中被治理的世界

The legacy: a world governed through crisis

2025年留下的遗产
，是一种持久的心态转变：稳定不再被视为理所当然，而是成为一种需要被管理
、分配 ，甚至反复谈判的状态
。

The legacy of 2025 will not be one dramatic memory, but a lasting mindset. A year that stability was no longer assumed but, it was managed, rationed, and negotiated daily.

那么
，为什么2025年比此前的年份更为重要？因为正是在这一年，一种微妙却决定性的转变发生了：各国不再把当下视为一段暂时的动荡期 ，而是开始以动荡将长期存在为前提来进行治理。

So why does 2025 matter more than the years before it? Because by this year, a subtle but decisive shift occurs. States stop behaving as though they are navigating temporary turbulence, and begin governing as though turbulence is permanent.

防务姿态趋于强硬
，贸易限制被常态化；同盟关系更多采取对冲而非信任；危机工具逐渐成为默认手段，应急措施演变为长期策略 ，例外政策不再例外
，危机语言也悄然融入了日常政治表达之中 。

Defence postures harden. Trade restrictions become normalised. Alliances hedged rather than trusted. Crisis tools turn into default instruments and emergency measures became long-term strategies, exceptional policies became normal and, crisis language became everyday language.

如果历史学家日后回望这一年，或许会这样评价：2025年并不是世界崩塌的一年 ，而是世界开始接受自身已难以被轻易修复的一年
。这正是所谓“转轴之年”的含义所在——它并非不稳定的起点
，而是不稳定被真正嵌入、并逐步制度化的时刻。

If historians look back, they may say:2025 was the year the world did not break, but the year it accepted that it would not easily be repaired. This is the essence of a hinge year. Not the start of instability, but the moment when instability becomes embedded.

作为“门槛之年 ”的2025年

2025 as a Threshold Year

2025年的独特之处，并不在于它化解了这些紧张关系 ，而在于它让这些紧张关系变得无法回避 。关于世界能够回到稳定 、统一秩序的幻象正在消散
。取而代之的，并非必然是悲观情绪
，而是一种责任——一种直面复杂性
、对其加以治理而非否认其存在的责任。

What makes 2025 distinctive is not that it resolves these tensions, but that it renders them unavoidable. The illusion of a return to stable, unified global maps has faded. What replaces it is not necessarily pessimism, but responsibility: the responsibility to govern complexity rather than deny it.

人们对世界能够回到由一套单一规则所支配的稳定、统一秩序的信念，正在逐渐消退 。取而代之的 ，是一项更为艰巨 、也更具挑战性的任务：如何在避免碎片化的同时治理多元
，在不走向解体的前提下容纳差异
。

The belief that the world can return to a stable, unified order governed by a single set of rules has faded. In its place emerges a more demanding task: governing plurality without fragmentation, diversity without disintegration.

从2025年逐渐浮现的未来，很可能是多元的
、不均衡的 ，也充满竞争与博弈的。进步将以局部、零散的方式出现
，而在其他领域则可能遭遇挫折 。治理形态也将呈现出混合特征——正式制度与非正式网络并存，城市与国家相互交织 ，公共权威与公民创新共同发挥作用。

The future emerging from 2025 is likely to be plural, uneven, and contested. Progress will occur in pockets, setbacks elsewhere. Governance will be hybrid, combining formal institutions with informal networks, cities with states, public authority with civic innovation.

在这样的格局中
，真正的任务已不再是重新绘制一张单一的全球版图，而是学会在多张彼此重叠 、相互交错的版图中前行：在碎片化的空间之间搭建桥梁 ，把短期的适应性应对与长期的结构性转型协调起来
，以治理成效而非修辞话语重塑合法性，并重新将权力与责任连接起来
。

In this landscape, the task is not to redraw a single global map, but to learn how to navigate multiple, overlapping ones, to build bridges between fragmented spaces, align short-term adaptation with long-term transformation, and recover legitimacy through effectiveness rather than rhetoric, and reconnecting power with responsibility.

“碎裂的版图
”并不仅仅是一种隐喻 ，它在现实中具有明确的物理呈现，体现为风险分布的高度不均。气候暴露、经济脆弱性与政治不稳定性在空间上日益叠加
、相互交织
，不断强化脆弱性循环 。

Fractured maps are not only metaphorical. They manifest physically in the uneven distribution of risk. Climate exposure, economic vulnerability, and political instability increasingly overlap spatially, reinforcing cycles of fragility.

这种空间层面的复杂性，对仍然以国家为中心、以领土为基本单位的治理框架构成了严峻挑战
。为有限 、封闭的国家空间而设计的政策 ，往往难以应对那些具有系统性
、流动性和跨国属性的风险。结果便是治理上的失配：在技术层面高度精密的干预措施
，却难以真正触及社会现实 。

This spatial complexity challenges governance frameworks that remain largely state-centric and territorial. Policies designed for bounded national spaces struggle to address risks that are systemic, mobile, and transboundary. The result is frequent misalignment: technically sophisticated interventions that fail to engage social realities.

因此，理解2025年 ，需要一种多尺度的视角
，能够同时把握全球体系、国家层面的政策，以及地方层面的现实经验
。否则 ，“碎裂的版图”就不再只是对现实的描述
，反而会变成一种预设——不断固化分裂，而非加以化解。

Understanding 2025 thus requires a multi-scale lens, capable of reading global systems, national policies, and local experiences simultaneously. Without such an approach, fractured maps become not only descriptive, but prescriptive, reinforcing fragmentation rather than addressing it.

美国总统决定不邀南非参加下一届G20峰会 。全球协调机制在2026年可能继续面临裂痕
。图源：路透社

结论：学会治理一个“版图碎裂 ”的世界

Conclusion: Learning to Govern a World of Fractured Maps

由此也引出了一个最终的问题：2025年所留下的影响
，是否将具有长期性？

And that leaves us with a final question. Is the legacy of 2025, likely to be long-lasting?

在“版图碎裂
”的一年里所显现的未来，并不是对全球治理的讣告 ，而更像是一份关于转型的诊断书。世界并非不可治理，而是正在以不同于以往的方式被治理 。真正的难题在于
，如何调整制度安排 、认知框架与政治激励机制，使它们能够与当下现实的复杂性相匹配
。

The future in a year of fractured maps, is not an obituary for global governance, but a diagnosis of transition. The world is not ungovernable; it is differently governable. The difficulty lies in adjusting institutions, mental models, and political incentives to match the complexity of contemporary reality. 

这需要一次范式转变——学会接受那些曾经被视为非常态的情形 ，正在变成日常：要适应缺乏清晰护栏的竞争格局
，适应快于外交运转节奏的政治进程，适应由恐惧与机遇共同塑造的经济逻辑 ，适应依然存在却已难以形成广泛共识的制度体系；也要适应在危机条件下作出的决策
，即便原初理由早已消退，仍会长期存续；适应例外不断累积 ，直至反过来重塑规则本身。最终
，还要适应一种预期的下移——从对秩序的乐观想象，转向在无序之中寻求可持续的生存 。

This needs a paradigm shift to accept that what was once extraordinary to become routine. Adjusted to rivalry without clear guardrails, adjusted to politics that travel faster than diplomacy, adjusted to economics shaped by fear as much as opportunity, adjusted to institutions that persist, but no longer command consensus, adjust to decisions made under crisis conditions that tend to endure, even after the original justification fades, adjust to exceptions to multiply until they redefine the rule, adjust to downward expectations from optimism about order to endurance within disorder.

国际体系正是以这样的方式发生变化的——并非一夜之间 ，而是通过一次次悄然的再校准。从这个意义上看
，2025年或许将被铭记为这样一年：危机不再是例外，而是成为一种常态化的存在
。

This is how international systems change-not overnight- but through quiet recalibration. In that sense, 2025 may be remembered as the year crisis ceased to be an exception, and became a condition.

如果说以往的时代追求的是通过一致性实现统一 ，那么2025年之后的世界，则需要在多样性中建立协调与连贯。城市
、气候治理以及不断演化的领导形态
，未必会整齐地汇聚到同一轨道上，但它们可以被引导形成共振 。未来的关键 ，与其说在于修复旧有的世界版图
，不如说在于培育一种能力——以审慎、合乎伦理且集体性的方式，去理解和辨读新的世界图景
。

If earlier eras sought unity through uniformity, the post-2025 world will require coherence through diversity. Cities, climate governance, and evolving forms of leadership will not converge neatly, but they can be made to resonate. The future depends less on restoring old maps than on cultivating the capacity to read new ones carefully, ethically, and collectively.

2025年很可能会被记住为一个多重危机叠加的年份；更重要的是 ，它并非危机降临之年
，而是世界接受危机将长期存在的那一年——正是在这一年中作出的选择 、面临的约束与持续的再校准，深刻塑造了此后多年的国际体系走向。而接下来将走向何方 ，则取决于适应究竟能转化为更新与重塑
，还是滑向消极的接受与退却 。

2025 could very well be remembered as a year of compounded crisis, and more importantly not the year crisis arrived but the year the world accepted that crisis was here to stay: A year whose choices, constraints, and recalibrations shaped the international system for years afterward. And what comes next depends on whether adaptation turns into renewal or resignation.

关于IPP

华南理工大学公共政策研究院（IPP）是一个独立
、非营利性的知识创新与公共政策研究平台
。IPP围绕中国的体制改革、社会政策 、中国话语权与国际关系等开展一系列的研究工作，并在此基础上形成知识创新和政策咨询协调发展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造开放式的知识创新和政策研究平台 ，成为领先世界的中国智库 。